This interview was conducted in 2021 by the Mashhad branch of the Office for the Preservation and Publication of the Works of Ayatollah Khamenei. The full text is presented below.
Question: To begin our conversation, as the first question, could you please elaborate on the Commander-in-Chief’s position in the Islamic Republic of Iran?
A. A. Hajizadeh: The Commander-in-Chief’s role within the military and defense sectors of the Islamic Republic is truly extensive. In recent years, there may have been limited references to arms production and weaponry, but I believe its dimensions are far broader, and these aspects are quantifiable. This is not simply a broad generalization; rather, every aspect is supported by concrete evidence.
The impact of the Leader’s presence during the eight years of the Sacred Defense [Iran-Iraq War] — within the limits allowed by the late Imam [Khomeini] — was significant, as Imam Khamenei was not granted authority for extended periods. Over the past three decades following the Imam’s passing, his role in military affairs has been decisive. One reason for this, perhaps, lies in the Leader’s profound understanding of the enemy and his strategic intelligence acumen. Over these three decades, we have navigated past major conspiracies and safely avoided traps set by the enemies against our system. In all of these cases, the Supreme Leader's role and his directives has been unmistakably evident.
Question: How has the Leader’s role been in managing crises and navigating the country through security and military traps? Could you provide specific examples?
A. A. Hajizadeh: Let me cite a few examples. During the liberation of Kuwait in the first Gulf War, many figures inside the country argued that Saddam Hussein had assumed the role of Khalid ibn al-Walid and that we ought to align with him to fight against the US. Even some officials in positions of authority at the time advocated this view. The only person who recognized this as a trap and understood that both sides of this conflict represented misguided factions — that is, the West, including the US and Europe, on one side, and Saddam on the other — was the Leader. He did not allow the country and our Armed Forces to be caught in this trap.
Or consider the war in Afghanistan — as well as many similar cases over the past 30 years — where entering these arenas would have been a trap for Iran. Avoiding them was due to the Leader’s intelligence acumen, vision, and expertise as Commander-in-Chief. His leadership is not merely administrative; it demands mastery and specialized knowledge — qualities we’ve witnessed him embody across all dimensions. He engages deeply in discussions in the company of experienced senior commanders. The reasoning he presents clearly reflects his competence and, in many instances, it has saved the country.
Look around us now, across West Asia, countries have truly collapsed, governments have been weakened, armies dismantled, insecurity has spread, and there is widespread chaos. These are the results of plans orchestrated by the US, Britain, the Zionist regime, and Western powers to destabilize the region. Their primary target was Iran. Observe the current state of Iraq, Afghanistan, or Syria. Even though Iran stepped in and offered help, ultimately their armies were weakened and their countries devastated.
In some cases where we needed to intervene, there were still those who said, "No, we shouldn’t get involved." For instance, when Takfiri groups like ISIS invaded and occupied parts of Syria and Iraq, many asked, “What does this have to do with us? Why should we get involved?” In that instance, the Supreme Leader issued a decisive order: “We must intervene.” Years later, it’s easy to judge. Today, we can easily speak about the Gulf War, Afghanistan, or the traps set by our enemies. But back then, it was the Leader who made these decisions, including the decision to enter the Syrian conflict. Because had we not fought there, we would have had to fight in Tehran, Kermanshah, or Hamedan. In other words, we had to intervene in one place and not get involved in another place. It was his strategic guidance and leadership that steered us through. This, in my view, is a pivotal issue worthy of deeper discussion.
The second key point is that now our Armed Forces, our military forces — the Army, the IRGC, and the Basij — all have a spirit of courage, valor, and defiance against oppression. The notion of defeat against any foreign army doesn’t even occur to them. They feel powerful. They are powerful. This strength is the result of the training they’ve undergone since the victory of the Revolution, and especially over the past three decades.
Question: How has the spiritual and ideological training of the Armed Forces over the years been connected to the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, and how has it been implemented?
A. A. Hajizadeh: During the eight years of war, we faced Saddam. But afterward, the focus shifted to the US and Western threats. Well, there were concerns that our power did not match theirs. But now, our fighters and forces, with courage at all levels, do not feel that they could ever fall short against anyone. It is now widely acknowledged that Iran’s Armed Forces — the IRGC and the Army — are all collectively strong.
How has this mindset been cultivated? Over the past three decades, all the programs related to the Armed Forces [have played a role] — the training programs, the educational programs, our ceremonies, the meetings that the Supreme Leader has weekly on a continuous basis with the commanders. These meetings are consistent. They may increase in number but never decrease, with at least one meeting each week. In fact, he has dedicated one day exclusively to military personnel.
These ongoing practices by the Leader have instilled this mindset and readiness within the forces. These aren’t merely about weapons and tools — they have a spiritual aspect, an ideological aspect, and an educational aspect. This is one of the many areas where the Leader has played a pivotal role and now the material he has in this field is so rich and profound that it could be used to publish numerous books.
Question: What has been the Leader of the Islamic Revolution’s role in achieving self-sufficiency and domestic arms production, and what decisive decisions have been made in this regard?
A. A. Hajizadeh: In the years following the war, the Leader encouraged self-sufficiency, domestic production, and standing on our own feet in the field of armaments. However, determining which path to take, which weapons to produce domestically, and how to accomplish this is a critical point. Two key developments occurred: one is the conviction that “we can” move toward weapons capability, and the other is choosing the right direction for this endeavor.
Over the past thirty years, perhaps starting from around 1363 AHS [1984-85], we see these emphases recurring, especially in missile technology. Had we followed the path taken by the world — where both East and West primarily pursued offensive weapons like aircraft, now reaching fifth-generation fighters — we would likely still be struggling and striving to advance with third-generation technology. What does that mean? It means that no matter what we did, we would have been behind them, with a fifty-year gap.
Instead of moving behind the enemy and never catching up with them, we chose a path that has now allowed us to stand against them. And while it may be true that when we saw the threats, we initially pursued a threat-based approach in those years, we also sought capabilities that would enable us to respond to those threats. On many occasions, at least in this past decade, we have adopted goal-oriented approaches, pursuing certain matters — specific armaments and capabilities — that would, from a certain point onward, achieve successes that would render all of the enemy's capabilities ineffective. The Leader’s management role in this domain has been truly precise, and its impact unparalleled.
In some instances, the decisions made by the Leader of the Islamic Revolution — the interventions he undertakes — I would venture to say, change the course of our military history. The strategic frameworks he establishes are incredibly influential. Let me cite a few examples:
In 1363 AHS [1984-85], we were given a limited number of missiles. The government decided to allocate two of these limited missiles for reverse engineering. For instance, we obtained thirty missiles from Libya, two of which were set aside for production purposes. This occurred over two years, during which our stockpile never exceeded seven or eight missiles at any given time. In other words, because there was a war and we were engaged in conflict, when a missile arrived, we would fire it. Now, imagine taking two from your stock of just seven or eight and setting them aside for reverse engineering! This was an extremely difficult decision.
I remember a meeting where the Leader himself — he was the President at the time — visited a site where the IRGC's research team had begun their work. At the time, we held a meeting. He was concerned and asked us, " Why are you being so overly meticulous with these? Why aren't you disassembling them quickly? Why won’t you start? What are you worried about?" He even joked, "If you don't open these soon, they might come and take them away or even fire them, and you’ll be left empty-handed!" The Leader placed great importance on research, domestic production, and local manufacturing. During those years, he personally inaugurated the missile production facility, and there is footage of this. What does this mean? It means this issue was prioritized from that very period, from those early years.
Therefore, this initiative kicked off, and it began during the war. However, it was a long, difficult, and complex endeavor in the missile sector and many other areas, as we lacked the basic infrastructure. Today, if we decide to build something, its components are already produced; we procure them and design a system. Back then, subsystems were simply not produced — the technology for them didn't exist in the country. In order to achieve missile technology, we first had to develop several prerequisite technologies.
In the early 1990s, around 1991, during the collapse of the Soviet Union, a situation suddenly arose where very good offers were made to Iran. The Soviet economy was in disarray, the collapse had occurred, and the newly independent states faced financial difficulties. They came to us, offering to sell missiles and launch platforms. The missiles we were buying from North Korea for $2.5 million each at the time — $2.5 million per unit! — they offered for $10,000 apiece. The launch platforms we were purchasing from the Koreans for $2.5–3 million, incomparable in quality to the Russians', they offered for $100,000. Well, within the Armed Forces — the missile division, the Air Force — not only was there no opposition to this purchase, but everyone was saying it was an excellent opportunity and that we should go and buy them immediately.
Only one person in the Islamic Republic opposed it and that was Imam Khamenei. Many of our officials even intervened and said that we should go convince him. But he objected, to the point where he became angry and said, "Why are you pursuing this? Stop pursuing it; no one is to pursue this matter." Why? Because we had begun missile production in 1363 AHS [1984-85]. By 1990-92, this effort was gradually bearing fruit. Just as it was yielding results, what were we about to do? Go buy ready-made missiles. What would have been the outcome? The work would have stopped. To prevent this, the Leader declared, "No purchases!" He even became angry and yelled at certain officials. He said, "Why are you pursuing this? Don't do it." He opposed it.
Question: What impact did that difficult decision to oppose the mass purchases of missile in the early years have on the course of Iran's missile industry?
A. A. Hajizadeh: Perhaps at that time, when those of us who were 29 or 30 years old — like Martyr Moghaddam, for instance — would say: "If only the Leader would agree! If only we could buy them! Why didn't we buy them?" At that time, we ourselves didn't realize how impactful this strategy was. Had our path not been chosen correctly and had the Leader not determined our direction, rest assured the path to achieving surface-to-surface missiles, longer-range missiles, would either not have been taken at all or would have faced significant delays.
Because if you buy something, they might give you other things too in the subsequent stages, but after that, the entire approach becomes one of purchasing. The purchasing path might remain open to some extent, but after a while it would close and you would no longer be able to buy, or you couldn't acquire new specifications or longer ranges. You wouldn’t be able to buy anymore. So, this course that the Leader laid out was very decisive.
Question: If we were to compare the country's military situation at the end of the Sacred Defense with today, what differences can be seen?
A. A. Hajizadeh: Now let me tell you, we can only have an accurate assessment of what has happened, how much progress we've made, when we can actually make a comparison. We need to examine the end of the war and the acceptance of the [UN] resolution, recall where we were, and see where we stand today in the year 1400 AHS [2021-22]. Let's see how much progress we've made in these past 32 years.
When the IRGC entered the war, it had nothing, but by the end of the war it possessed some captured equipment. At most, it was artillery, tanks, mortars and light to medium weapons. We did not have advanced weaponry. As for the Army — ten years had passed since the Revolution, eight of which were spent in war — whatever it had was either damaged or depleted, and most importantly, we had fallen a decade behind the world's cutting-edge technology. During those years, we were under sanctions and no one would sell us anything.
The countries that manufactured weapons made progress, and those aligned with the West or East received weapons from them. Iraq received weapons, advanced weapons, until the last day of the war, but we couldn't get them. They wouldn't give them to us. We were under sanctions and those sanctions set us back. At the war's end, our military situation, our capabilities, and our armaments were lagging behind. We really were not in a good situation — neither the Army nor the IRGC was in good shape. We lacked proper resources — just a handful of Western equipment, some were Eastern, captured items etc., all of which were far behind modern capabilities.
So, when you consider where we stood at the end of the Sacred Defense era, you see how far behind we were. Now look at where we are today. Over the past three decades, our arms embargoes have become stricter. Not only did they not get easier, but they gradually became even more stringent than during the war. No one helped us either. We also faced economic sanctions — sometimes more, sometimes less — and ultimately these economic sanctions also brought economic problems and pressure, meaning they would exert pressure, drive down oil prices, and naturally the Armed Forces could never get all the funding they needed. They were always struggling, both in terms of budget and countless other issues.
Question: How were these major advancements achieved under tough sanctions? And what strategic role did the Leader of the Islamic Revolution play in this regard?
A. A. Hajizadeh: Now, let's examine our current position. Look at where we are today in terms of our armaments, our surface-to-surface missile systems, our UAVs, radars, electronic warfare, air defense, and many other areas, both on land and at sea. Today, we are recognized as a world-class force, not merely a regional power. The country’s overarching goals and strategic documents state we should be among the region's top-tier countries economically, or one of the top three. In the military sphere, however, our standing isn't regional, it's global.
If there are twenty countries in the world that produce high-quality, and up-to-date radars — their levels may differ somewhat — we are certainly among those twenty countries. How many countries are active in the world in the field of drones and unmanned aerial vehicle technology? We are definitely among the top five countries.
We are now among the countries capable of building modern air defense systems. I mean, consider the circumstances under which this was achieved: our hands were tied, we were sanctioned, we faced arms embargoes, and even visitation bans — meaning we weren't even allowed to attend some of the world's military exhibitions. They wouldn't invite us, nor would they grant us entry. The sanctions were truly at their maximum. No other country faced such conditions. Now we've reached this point. Was it accidental? No, work was done, leadership has been exercised, roadmaps have been provided, priorities were set, the course was charted, and that is how we achieved this result. And the pivotal figure in this has been the Supreme Leader.
Question: What role and guidance has the Leader of the Islamic Revolution provided in making specialized decisions related to missiles and drones?
A. A. Hajizadeh: In the missile sector, over the past twelve years at least, we have maintained direct and ongoing contact with the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, coordinating fundamental issues with him both in person and through written correspondence. He has provided authoritative insight in this field and, at times, would even correct our course of progress. For instance, when we were working to increase the speed of missile systems, he emphasized prioritizing precision.
We would debate among ourselves. The team would argue, for example, that when hitting a target with a one-ton warhead, precision didn’t matter. Even if it landed 200 meters off, the target would still be destroyed. So, why invest so much in accuracy? Especially since we lacked the infrastructure and resources. But years later, we realized that sometimes we must select one building out of four to precisely target a terrorist group there. [Or sometimes we must use] even a smaller warhead, [because] only the terrorist leader needed to be eliminated. We saw this in the fight against ISIS, in targeting Takfiri terrorist groups in Iraqi Kurdistan, or when some of our border guards were ambushed in the southeast. To counter and eliminate their leader, we needed this kind of precision. In these types of situations, we understood that precision truly mattered — that the strike had to be exact. At certain points in the development of the aerospace program, some former commanders had a preference for developing the air force and aircraft. The Leader said, "Don't focus too much on this sector — it's not your mission. That's the army's responsibility. You should focus solely on missiles. Don't pursue other areas."
Or in recent years in the drone sector, a new power has emerged, and we are seeing the impact. Something significant has happened. After the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict in Karabakh, many nations recognized the crucial and game-changing role of drones. A single drone costing around $30,000 can destroy an S-300 missile site worth $300m. A multi-million-dollar tank or a Katyusha launcher in troop fortifications can be taken out by a drone. They are realizing this today.
Years ago, the Leader emphasized the importance of this. There was motivation and interest within the forces, and it has been actively pursued. Now, we are at a global level. We lack nothing. In some areas, we are even ahead. The innovation is Iranian, the work is Iranian, and it is completely unique — it has innovative qualities.
Question: In general, if you were to summarize the role of Imam Khamenei’s leadership in Iran's current power, what would you say?
A. A. Hajizadeh: I believe that the Leader’s role in the fields of military and defense affairs is significant. While I've only touched on three aspects here, the reality is far more comprehensive and warrants thorough examination, study, and analysis. Today, if Iran stands as a powerful nation and a regional force — acknowledged even by the US and Westerners themselves when they admit, for example, that "Iran has taken away our air superiority after 75 years with its drones" — this is no small statement. These words come from a US military commander.
Or consider the strike on Ain al-Asad base — they say Iran hit precisely the exact spot it decided to target. In combating ISIS too — these terrorist groups weren't conventional armies where frontlines could be established. They were individuals living in houses, possibly alongside women and children. We had to identify and strike only ISIS-specific targets, and we did so under the watchful eyes of the entire world.
It was in a place where American aircraft were flying, where Europeans, Syria, and Turkey were present. The operation wasn't in a location where we could say we went into some mountain crevice, did something, and then just claimed we did it. Rather, it was exposed to the entire world, and everyone was judging. And, well, everyone praised our work and said we did an excellent job.
Today, the security we enjoy in the country has directly translated into safety for the people. [Yet,] security challenges persist in some parts [of the region]. That shows security can’t be borrowed. Right now, when US troop numbers decrease in the region, Arab states express concern and say they are worried about America leaving. Why? Because the power they hold isn't truly theirs — it is borrowed from the US.
We owe these achievements to the strategic vision and leadership of the Supreme Leader and, God willing, our power will certainly grow day by day. And if these "prescriptions" that have been issued — I explained the military aspect, but they also exist for the economy, culture, lifestyle, and various affairs, and they exist for everything — if the various officials, the people, and those who ultimately bear responsibility act on them, this country, God willing, will flourish.
Question: To what extent has the Aerospace Force utilized young talents and scientific elites, and how much of our current achievements are attributable to these young professionals?
A. A. Hajizadeh: Yes, you see, these successes have been achieved in the Aerospace Force, and because of the operations that have been carried out, this is acknowledged by nearly everyone. Now, whenever we talk about this, we say the missile industry started in 1984. Everyone might think that, well, 37 years have passed, so it must have been a bunch of old men from that time who were motivated and did these things. But I am telling you right now, the average age in the Aerospace Force is 33. The average age of our commanders — from battalion commanders to base commanders up to regional commanders — is between 35 and 40.
As a matter of fact, in our research sector, the people conducting research and carrying out production work are all young. Did we accomplish all this solely with the young talent within the Aerospace Force? No. This capability and power has been realized through the efforts of the entire nation. Today, we maintain strong ties with universities across the country. What the Leader has repeatedly emphasized — that for any transformation in industry to occur, there must be a strong link between industry and academia — is something we have now fully established.
We have supported and encouraged many talented young individuals, and they went on to establish knowledge-based companies that have since become contractors in various fields, both with us and with others. These achievements, for the most part, have been made possible by these very youth. In my view, the solution to overcoming many of our challenges lies with these young people, provided we also make use of the experience of those who are older. When we speak of the youth, we don’t mean appointing a 30-year-old as a minister. That’s not what we’re talking about. But after all, not all responsibilities are at the level of a minister or a president. Just look at how many directors-general, governors, district governors we have, not to mention all the positions across factories, the industrial sector, and universities. Young people can step into all of these roles and we have had highly successful experiences in this field.
The scale of our operations cannot be sustained by a few hundred or even two thousand people. Naturally, it is the youth who drive these efforts forward. I believe the key to progress — not just in defense and military sectors, but also in economic and other fields — lies in trusting these young individuals and empowering them to tackle the challenges ahead. And we have made full use of their potential.
Question: What other memories do you have from your meetings with the Leader of the Islamic Revolution?
A. A. Hajizadeh: I have mentioned a few cases. However, it’s not as though the Leader involves himself in every single affair and, for instance, offers alternative directives on ongoing operations. On many occasions when we've reported to him, he's simply said: "Continue on the same course. You’re on the right path."
One particularly memorable moment was when I asked him directly: "Sir, are you satisfied with the Aerospace Force?" He replied: "I'm satisfied with the entire IRGC. Of course, not all departments are the same, but I'm very pleased with the Aerospace Force." These moments were really pleasant. It was good to know that we had earned the Leader's approval.
The Leader doesn’t just attend a meeting, make a few remarks, and leave it at that. He comes fully prepared, having studied the subject matter in advance. Many times, during our sessions, we've realized he's carefully reviewed all previous reports and documentation in detail. When you have meetings with certain individuals, you see them glancing at their watch, they look bored. This kind of attitude is discouraging. The Leader, on the other hand, studies things thoroughly, he knows the background of things, he knows the strategies, and has a multi-year process in mind.
Question: Considering you have highlighted that the today’s military advancements are the result of implementing the Leader's directives, what advice would you offer to other officials?
A. A. Hajizadeh: With the experience we have gained over the years from the guidelines, strategies, and leadership of the Leader, I believe that if officials take these prescriptions and strategies seriously — those that the Leader has outlined across various sectors, including past ones — they will achieve progress. I believe that every minister should come prepared with the thirty years of the Leader’s strategies related to their ministry, study these frameworks, and be able to apply them effectively.
In other words, the Leader has strategies in all sectors. They can serve as a roadmap. You see, progress isn’t just about running faster. Some say we should work 24 hours or 20 hours a day! But that is not necessarily effective — those extra hours could even possibly lead us astray. When some officials overwork, it results in a great number of mistakes and setbacks. We need to move accurately in the right direction. The path must be correct, the tracks must be properly aligned, and the roadmap must be correct. In my opinion, the strategies adopted by the Leader are a great asset for us. If all sectors make good use of these three decades of strategies, I believe, God willing, the country will be saved.
Question: From your perspective, what has been the secret to the progress and success of the country's missile industry?
A. A. Hajizadeh: The secret to progress and success in the aerospace sector — of which missiles are one component — lies first and foremost in remaining faithful to the established objectives and strategy. While different commanders may have come and gone, they have all maintained this fidelity. In other sectors, we sometimes see a new official completely discrediting their predecessor. Even if out of ten actions taken, three were flawed and seven correct, one shouldn't discard everything.
We may have adjusted our roadmap along the way. Certainly, the path I have taken differs in some ways from that of Martyr Moghadam, General Salami, and previous commanders — yet we've all remained faithful to the ultimate objective. This has been a collective effort, with everyone participating and believing in the mission.
Another point is that we may have some managers who truly have good ideas — I have personally experienced this — they may be knowledgeable and competent, but it is essential to bring all managers on board. If they're not aligned and we just issue orders, the work will only progress while the order is in place, and then it will be abandoned. Why are we still loyal to the work that General Moghaddam did? Because Martyr Moghaddam would sit with us, talk to us, and bring us along. Since we all understood the issues well, we thought like Martyr Moghaddam. This is very decisive. It is unclear what results the individual action of an official in a closed room will yield, where they just want to make decisions alone. You may know some things, you may even be an expert, but you need to come, sit down, talk to the team, and consult them. These exchanges of views bring people together. Even if in the end, 20 or 30 percent of them don’t agree with your conclusions, they will still remain loyal to you.
Comment