Question: What is the theoretical basis of the Islamic Republic's view and consequently, that of the country's security organizations — all of which converge on the Secretariat of the Supreme National Security Council — regarding "national security"?
A. A. Ahmadian: From our perspective, the people are the pillar of national security. The Islamic Revolution triumphed with the people, was created by the people, and remains with the people. All theories surrounding the issue of "national security" are subordinate to the pillar of the people. And when I say "people," I mean all the people, because all the people participated in the Revolution. The idea that a specific group in the country carried out the Revolution is incorrect. Yes, contributions varied in different tasks – in some fields, one group contributed more, while in another, another group had a greater share — but the Revolution was carried out by the entire Iranian nation.
This perspective is rooted in both the theoretical foundations and the practical stances of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution. Just a few years ago, he stated that the Islamic Republic is meaningless without the people and is nothing without them. This Revolution, from the very beginning, was founded on the principle of moving with the people, seeing its power in the presence of the people, and recognizing the power of the people as its own. In the words of the Leader of the Revolution, “religious democracy” means that based on Islam, the “people” are the leaders of society and their own affairs, and the Revolution has raised this voice throughout the world. Therefore, wherever the Islamic Revolution has gone, its hallmark is that the people have risen, rather than a certain individual.
Regarding Syria, if there is any discussion on this subject, the point is that we did not bring the Syrian government to power. The Assad family's government existed before us, and it was firmly established. Due to our significant and commendable shared characteristic of uncompromising opposition to the Zionist regime and resistance against America and Israel, we had interactions and mutual support.
The second important point we adhere to is the Leader of the Islamic Revolution’s theory of "realistic idealism". He proposed this theory in response to the common dichotomy of "idealism" or "realism", emphasizing that idealism without realism is an illusion, and realism without ideals is merely a daily routine.
Question: Over the past decade, the expansion of terrorist groups’ activities in the region has prompted the Islamic Republic of Iran to extend its military and advisory presence beyond its official borders in order to conduct anti-terrorism operations. Iran's military and advisory presence is, of course, subject to certain principles and regulations. What are these regulations?
A. A. Ahmadian: The presence of the Islamic Republic of Iran anywhere, even in places where this presence has had an idealistic basis, has always been governed by certain principles. While there may have been exceptions where mistakes have occurred, but the foundation has always been the principles that I will mention:
The first principle emphasizes a resolute defense of the country, the people, and national interests against foreign threats. There has never been any doubt about this principle. Regardless of whether the enemy has been the United States, Israel, a small country, or a neighbor, this principle has always served as the basis for action.
Another important principle is that we have never been the initiators of aggression against anyone. The Leader of the Islamic Revolution has truly adhered to this principle. Many times, others have brought a situation to the brink of decision, but when it has reached the leadership level, he has intervened gradually teaching this to other officials as well.
The third principle is non-interference in the affairs of other countries. Despite its idealistic slogans and occasionally global perspective, the Islamic Revolution has refrained from intervening in other countries due to those ideals or even for national interests — which reflects a realistic approach — except under three specific conditions:
First of all, the official government in a country needs to make a formal request. In both Syria and Iraq, we received an official request from the then governments of these two countries for our presence. For example, if you remember, during the incident involving the assassination and martyrdom of Martyr Soleimani, the Prime Minister of Iraq stated that he had invited Martyr Soleimani to Iraq. During our presence in the fight against DAESH, Mr. Maliki (the then Prime Minister of Iraq) sought our assistance in combating DAESH. Therefore, an official request was certainly one of the prerequisites.
Secondly, it is essential to avoid confrontation with the people. Whenever someone invites us to go somewhere today, for example, to get involved with the people there in their favor, we definitely will not do such a thing, and this is one of the principles that we pay attention to.
Thirdly, the presence of a clear interest or aspiration is certain. There, we either need to have a definitive national interest or a strong ideal such as our commitment to "defending the oppressed," which is one of our ideals and principles. If a nation is oppressed and the other two conditions that I mentioned are present, there is no reason for us not to intervene, as it becomes a religious and humanitarian obligation on our shoulders.
Of course, there are times when defending the oppressed is not possible, in which case we cannot do anything and can only express our disapproval with our words. However, there are times when the conditions are right, the people have been oppressed, and their government is seeking help. In this case, there is no reason for us not to assist them, while adhering to the principle of assistance, not substitution. This means that the people themselves must engage in battle and be present on the field so we can help them.
Question: The military and security relations between Iran and Syria have not been limited to the past decade. What underpins these relations, and what has been the reason for Iran's presence in Syria? Additionally, what factors have contributed to the recent reduction of Iran's military presence in the region?
A. A. Ahmadian: Since the time when the Syrian government, under Hafez al-Assad, genuinely supported the Islamic Revolution and, despite the ruling Ba'ath Party in Iraq, still provided us with decisive support during the war, we expanded our official and field interactions. One reason for Syria's closeness to Iran was that Egypt and Jordan had reconciled with the Zionist regime, while Syria had not submitted to this act and therefore felt isolated and threatened as a result.
On the other hand, the governance system in Syria was like the other Arab systems in the region. The positive and distinguishing characteristic of the Assad family was that, in all fairness, they did not yield to all the international and regional pressures, as well as those from friends, acquaintances, and enemies, regarding the issue of resistance against Israel and defending the rights of the Palestinian people. If they had compromised even slightly, they would not have faced any of these events, and therefore everything that happened was the price of that resistance.
However, despite the anti-Zionist stance of the Syrian government, there were undesirable behaviors observed in part of the existing system within the Syrian government towards its people, which has created a rift between the government and a segment of the Syrian population. A number of people genuinely wanted the government, but there were also some who didn’t. They had opinions and disagreements, which did not begin with the presence of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
On the one hand, there has been a longstanding challenge between Hafez al-Assad’s government and various ideological currents in the Islamic world, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, leading to ongoing disputes between them. Since its formation, and since Hafez Assad’s time, the Islamic Republic of Iran, has constantly recommended and worked towards guiding that region towards social and popular convergence. The reason for this is the belief that the people of a country are decisive, and this has always been central to the Islamic Republic’s approach.
Later on, a third phenomenon emerged there, which was the rise of DAESH; the sedition of DAESH. We must completely separate the behavior of the Islamic Republic of Iran during the DAESH period from that of the period before it. Yes, we decisively entered into war with DAESH, just as we fought against them in Syria and Iraq. Today, if DAESH reappears around us with the same characteristics and traits as before, and poses a threat to us in the future, we will naturally suppress it there; of course, while adhering to the same conditions I mentioned earlier. But what characteristics did DAESH have that led us to this conclusion?
Firstly, DAESH was a fabricated creation of intelligence agencies. We knew and were aware of how they were released from which prisons, who worked with them, where they were taken, how they were groomed, and how they were given a very respectable appearance. In the beginning, DAESH tried to present a legitimate image of itself and wanted to be a counterfeit of the entire Islamic Revolution. Therefore, DAESH had no original identity of its own.
Secondly, DAESH lacked a territorial base; the very important point here is that DAESH did not belong to any territory; there was no place where we could say, “This is their country, their geography, these are the people of this land, and we recognize them officially here.” No, they were completely without territory; meaning, wherever we fought them, it wasn't a place that belonged to them.
Thirdly, they considered everywhere as their own territory; they regarded the lands of others as their own property, and they believed that the rest of the Islamic countries and the countries in the region belonged to them. Therefore, they were adversaries of all the countries in the region, including Iran.
Fourthly, they had a Takfiri mindset towards all Islamic sects. The foundation of DAESH was based on Takfir, not only targeting Shia but also declaring all others as non-believers except for themselves.
Fifthly, they engaged in mass terrorism. By any standard, DAESH was a terrorist organization. Essentially, its main weapon was terrorism, and this remains the case today. Their terrorism was not directed against political or military figures but against the general population. Everyone remembers the explosion in Kerman. DAESH issued a statement claiming that the martyr-seeking fighters had carried out a successful operation! They acknowledged it themselves. They still pursue these actions daily. Our security forces constantly arrest various teams that they send into the country, and a continuous, hidden war is ongoing. For instance, sometimes they arrest twenty of their groups within the country. Once DAESH's presence was established, there was no room for hesitation. However, some of the Syrian opposition groups either helped the emergence of such a movement in some way, or later joined it, thereby strengthening it, making us become involved as well. In this case of course, from the beginning, we clearly distinguished between DAESH and other opposition groups. By God’s grace, DAESH was eliminated through successive and organized operations, both in Iraq and Syria. However, regarding the other opposition groups — which were mainly the same opposition groups involved in the events in Aleppo, Damascus, East and West Ghouta, and Daraa and Suwayda in the south — the Islamic Republic of Iran attempted to mediate between them and the government.
Of course, if we were attacked somewhere, we would defend ourselves. In the areas where we were present to fight DAESH — for example, we needed the Aleppo airport or routes like the Aleppo-Damascus highway — we had defensive lines there. If anyone attacked us, we had to defend ourselves, or even sometimes push them back a little. But our goal was never to eradicate them like we did DAESH. Even when they were under siege and it was decided that they would be evacuated, we ensured their safety so that they could be transferred from these various points to Idlib. In Aleppo, some of our friends put their lives at stake to transfer the families of these same opposition members, who were in a part of Aleppo, to this region of Idlib. Later, in all political agreements, we supported the idea that they should have a place of their own, that they could settle there, and that it would be a de-escalation area where no one would confront them.
With the end of DAESH, the region was handed over to the Syrian army, and our full presence was no longer relevant. Of course, Bashar Assad's government was also under intense pressure from the Arabs, Israel, and the United States due to presence of Iranians. They were clamoring that Iran had conquered Syria and so on! Well, what occurred was that almost all of our forces withdrew from there, leaving only the part that was necessary for Resistance or for assistance to the Syrian army or government.
Question: There are analyses saying that the various groups present in northwest Syria were making moves before the recent offensive. Had Iran not provided Syria with any intelligence regarding these movements?
A. A. Ahmadian: Each of these groups has a different origin and perspective on Turkey, Syria, Iran, Shias, and Israel. As a result, they hold different stances. From this perspective, they are a disorganized collection, yet they were in the process of reaching an agreement to carry out such an action. These movements were repeatedly communicated to the Syrian government, and they themselves did not lack intelligence capabilities — they were aware as well. However, two issues were at play here. First, Syrian officials and military did not believe these groups could carry out a significant action. Second, they relied on their own military and security apparatus. They assumed that even if these groups made a move and the situation became somewhat unstable, they would ultimately manage to contain it. Therefore, the Syrian government never seriously perceived the threat of these groups. Of course, they also didn’t expect such a potential for collapse within the Syrian military!
Eventually, they began their operations, and again, the Syrian army was repeatedly advised on where they could and should block them—because we believed that even if they intended to negotiate with these groups, they needed to solidify their position. However, there was no will to fight or desire to resist within the Syrian military. As a result, Syrian areas fell one by one, ultimately reaching Damascus. During this time, we had discussions with Bashar al-Assad and Syrian military officials, offering them advice and trying again to activate the political process. Mr. Araghchi’s trip to Turkey and his visit to Doha were part of this effort, which secured some successes. The statement of the D-8 group, in my view, was a good one, especially since five Arab countries in the region joined it, expressed their concerns, and called for a political resolution. However, the fast pace of the collapse left no opportunity for these efforts to take effect.
Question: There is a major ambiguity among the public in Iran regarding the country’s lack of direct involvement in countering this offensive. Had our country reached a conclusion not to intervene directly, or was there another reason?
A. A. Ahmadian: Iran was never supposed to fight on behalf of the Syrian army, especially against a force that does not pose a decisive threat to the Islamic Republic. If there had been sufficient readiness, an opportunity to transfer forces and equipment, and if the collapse had not occurred so rapidly — provided that the Syrian people and military had stood their ground — then we certainly would have stood with them as well. Moreover, the Syrian government did not make such a request from us until the very last days.
Question: Some hostile media outlets are trying to establish the notion that Iran’s past presence and expenditures in Syria were futile. What is your take on this claim?
A. A. Ahmadian: We have no regrets about our expenditures. I am not saying this as rhetoric; we are genuinely not regretful because our presence and expenditures were for our own security, and the expected outcomes were achieved as well. If Daesh had not been eliminated in Syria and Iraq, today we would have been fighting them within our own borders at costs ten times greater. I don’t think anyone doubts that if a Daesh government had been established in Iraq and Syria, we would have been forced to confront them at our borders, within the country, or along Iraq’s borders. They openly declared that their ultimate goal was Iran! Well, the objective of defeating Daesh was accomplished, and this was a significant achievement that completely blew the American plan and nullified years of their investments. Perhaps not everyone knows the details, but they had really built an army. By their own admission, they did government-building and society-making to counter the Islamic Revolution, thinking they had finished the job. Through the actions of the Islamic Republic of Iran, this plan was dismantled, and this achievement alone is sufficient justification for the costs of our presence.
Needless to say, we managed to strengthen Palestine and Hezbollah after all, equipping them so thoroughly that they’d be no longer dependent on us. Today, Hezbollah is a completely independent and self-reliant group. Concerning Gaza, for example, you see that inside tunnels, they are manufacturing rockets and missiles for themselves. Hezbollah, which operates on a larger territory, must have become even more powerful and better equipped. Hezbollah has gained political and cultural strength. Despite all the smear campaigns, you can see the overwhelming support Hezbollah receives within Lebanon today! Even people who have suffered severe hardships in their lives return with Hezbollah’s flag. These are the blessings and the strategic and cultural depths of the Islamic Revolution. Hezbollah enjoys such status in Lebanon. No one can eliminate Hamas, Islamic Jihad, or Hezbollah, nor can they erase Ansarullah. These groups have become deeply rooted in the people — people who have been armed, matured, and equipped with the knowledge and technology needed to produce the required equipment to defend themselves.
Question: Given the current circumstances, supporting the resistance appears to become more difficult, hasn’t it?
A. A. Ahmadian: Yes, it is becoming more difficult. Of course, at various times, our work has become harder, and at other times, it has become easier; this is natural and has been the case from the beginning. But the first point is that today, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad are not heavily reliant on our direct physical support. Look! Did we have direct contact with Hamas in Gaza during this period? We never did. The blockades imposed by Israel and its allies have always controlled the situation. Do we now have a direct land connection with Yemen? The sea routes are under blockade as well. Yet the people of Yemen surprise the world every day and produce missiles with a range of 1,000 kilometers! This is truly extraordinary.
It took us a long period to develop the capability to produce missiles, but the Yemenis achieved this in a short time. This is another blessing and honor of the Islamic Revolution. Wherever it steps, it elevates the people of that country, making them mature and dignified based on divine beliefs, not like Pharaoh, who made his people dependent and weak: “So he belittled his people, and they obeyed him” (Quran 43:54). This is the same approach America takes with its satellites today. In contrast, the Islamic Revolution, like Moses and other divine prophets, empowers others. How many years was Syria aligned with the former Soviet Union? It was a long period, yet they were not even given the technology to produce a single tank part independently. However, thanks to its connection with the Islamic Revolution, Syria developed missile production capabilities. Anyway, the resistance is not dependent on us for its survival. In addition, Iran’s connection with the resistance and Hezbollah will never be cut off.
Question: One of the significant ambiguities concerns Iran’s position in the region. Some of these ambiguities, at times bordering on accusations against the Islamic Republic, suggest that Iran is caught up in a cycle of weakening. What is your analysis of Iran’s current position in the region?
A. A. Ahmadian: This is the enemy’s psychological operation. The work of Satan is to instill fear: “Satan threatens you with poverty and commands you to immorality” (Quran 2:268). Israel’s strategy is to instill the feelings of weakness and humiliation. Unfortunately, I see that some people inside the country have fallen into this trap of the enemy’s psychological operation. That is, they unintentionally keep doing what Israel wants by perpetuating this feeling of weakness, effectively aiding the enemy’s strategy.
Some raise questions, sometimes maliciously and other times with specific agendas, such as: “What happened to Operation True Promise III? Are you striking now or tomorrow?” Well, the matter is clear — it follows military logic. We strike whenever it is necessary and appropriate, whenever it causes more pain to the enemy, and whenever it serves our national interests. Operations cannot and must not be carried out based on sentiments. Between the first and second phases of Operation True Promise, we analyzed the weaknesses in our initial strike and assessed the enemy’s capabilities. As a result, the second phase was better. These actions are governed by reason, planning, logic, and the realism I mentioned earlier.
In my view, firstly, today we must shift from a defensive stance in psychological and media operations to an offensive one. The reality tells us that if an act of aggression is committed against us, even many of those who are, so to speak, opposed to the government or have disagreements with it will rise to defend their country.
Secondly, from a strategic perspective, who has been truly defeated? Take a look at the situation of the Zionist regime in the 400–500 days since Operation Al-Aqsa Flood. Israel, which once appeared as a fabricated yet official state in the world, has now become a regime of occupation, genocide, and apartheid, with its prime minister under legal pursuit. In contrast, the Palestinian people have been recognized as the rightful inhabitants of this land and as a liberation movement fighting against occupation. The people of the world and even many official institutions have been compelled to acknowledge and defend the fact that Palestine belongs to the Palestinians, and that it is Israel that has been an occupying force for seventy years. The truth of the matter is that today Israel is in despair. Despite all its actions, it still lacks security and legitimacy. Its internal divisions have intensified significantly, and its economy is in dire conditions. Some Westerners say that the children of Gaza and Lebanon grow up to become either Yahya Sinwar or Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. Therefore, the general movement is one of victory for the Resistance Front and the Islamic Revolution — a movement of empowerment for the Islamic Revolution and of weakness and humiliation for Israel.
Question: Given your interpretations of the strength and reinforcement of the Resistance Front, it seems the Islamic Republic’s main reliance in confronting the Israeli regime is on empowering the people, the Islamic world, and the resistance to combat the regime, rather than solely focusing on military confrontation.
A. A. Ahmadian: Yes, that is correct. The Palestinian people must be able to defend themselves and respond to aggression against themselves. Israel, by its very nature, possesses the necessary and sufficient talent for collapse. It lacks the talent for long-term survival because it is a fake entity. The events of the past year have vividly illustrated this trajectory. Israel collapsed in the minds of people worldwide, and global perceptions have shifted. Today, there is no one who does not reject Israel. There is no one in the world who does not recognize the illegitimacy of Israel and the rightful cause of Palestine. Israel has lost its fabricated legitimacy and acceptance, revealing the reality of its occupation, genocide, and apartheid. This is the prevailing trend.
(The views expressed in this interview are interviewee’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of Khamenei.ir.)
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