Question: In today’s meeting with the Cabinet, the Leader of the Islamic Revolution referred to the recent negotiations and talked about the West’s insistence on putting a provision in the negotiations that would become an excuse for the further interference of the West. What was this provision and how was it brought up? What was our negotiators’ reaction to this provision?
Dr. Gharib Abadi: To advance and finalize the agreement and also in order to remove some of the sanctions, the US and the Europeans insisted that a clause be included in the Ministerial Statement o further talks in the future covering three issues: first, further measures to more effectively enhance Iran’s international trade and economic relations, including changes in U.S sanctions policy; second, guarantee the non-proliferation benefits of the JCPOA in long term; and third, steps to support for enhanced regional security among the countries of the Persian Gulf region, including de-escalation and confidence-building measures reached through dialogue in the region. Irrespective of the irrelevance of the second issue, because the timetables have been clearly set in the JCPOA and raising this issue can be considered to be a basis for inclusion of new commitments and timeframes, it should be noted that the third issue is also in clear contradiction with the goals and agenda determined for the negotiations. Therefore, the Iranian delegation immediately rejected this request.
In fact, the US and Europe sought to pursue their own specific goals. This showed that they still view the nuclear agreement as a bridge to entering other unrelated issues such as regional matters and the missile issue. This time, they even went to extremes and insisted that their request be incorporated in the text (of the negotiations). Their goal is to immediately raise another issue after each agreement and consider it as an inseparable part of the nuclear agreement in order to prepare the ground for their interference in those areas. Then whenever they are not able to achieve their goals, they wish to introduce Iran as the guilty side providing the grounds for them to exert pressure on Iran and seize on other excuses.
Question: The Leader of the Islamic Revolution pointed out that the Americans were not ready to give up their stubborn stance or to take even one step. Tell us more about how the Americans dealt in the negotiations.
Dr. Gharib Abadi: The Americans claim that they are ready to return to their commitments under the JCPOA and remove the sanctions that are inconsistent with it, but their performance in the negotiations does not corroborate this claim. There are various examples showing this that are worth consideration:
1. They have subjected the whole agreement to accepting a clause in future negotiations about regional issues, which is totally irrelevant to the subject of the negotiations and has a negative impact on the negotiations. They have made removing some of the sanctions and removing the name of the Revolutionary Guard Corps from the list of terrorist groups conditional on accepting the inclusion of this clause.
2. They were unwilling to cancel the executive order regarding the arms embargo on Iran, which is in clear conflict with Security Council Resolution 2,231 and the JCPOA, and this disproves America’s claim of being willing to return to its commitments under the JCPOA.
3. They were unwilling to remove the sanctions against more than 500 real and legal persons, who were sanctioned by Trump’s government based on non-nuclear excuses. They were also unwilling to repeal the Katsa Act against Iran even though all the measures taken by Trump, including using non-nuclear excuses to impose sanctions, were aimed at destroying the nuclear agreement completely. In addition, this shows the new American government’s determination to hold onto and use the cards created by the previous government and pursue the maximum pressure policy against Iran.
4. They were unwilling to offer a reliable guarantee that they would not repeat the actions of the previous government in relation to the nuclear agreement. They were not even ready to consider a logical time for the companies that enter into trade and economic activities with Iran to continue working with Iran so that they could finish their work without having any concerns about American international sanctions in case any problems should come up for their likely agreement (with Iran).
5. They were unwilling to discuss the damages they have inflicted upon Iran as a result of their illegal, unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear deal.
6. They have excessive demands regarding Iran’s nuclear commitments and activities, which are even beyond the text of the JCPOA. Of course, all of these were rejected by Iran. But this shows their attempts to sabotage the agreement and their spirit of malice.
7. With regard to verification, Iran fulfilled its commitments under the JCPOA in its initial model, which was also verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Then, the other side started carrying out their obligations for removing the sanctions. In the recent negotiations, the Americans were not ready to accept this reality that all of the existing problems have been caused by their hostile, disruptive behavior and they are the ones who must first fulfill their obligations. And only after verification in a reasonable time will Iran carry out its obligations. The American model for carrying out the basic commitments and verification in two days is only a formality and of no practical use.
Question: Considering the JCPOA experience and the increased sanctions in recent years, what approach and model should the Islamic Republic of Iran take in dealing with the American government’s plans in the nuclear negotiations?
Dr. Gharib Abadi: 1. The negotiations have not been finalized, and according to the diplomatic tradition, there is no agreement on anything unless everything is agreed upon. This principle means that if even 10% of the text of the negotiations has not been agreed upon, the negotiations are still incomplete and there is no agreement since the remaining issues may be more important than those agreed upon.
2. Iran’s upper position. The strategic Act passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the country’s nuclear achievements have created a good position for Iran in any negotiations. Naturally, the other side will attempt to prevent us from using our strengthened position using different means. But what matters is that we make the best of this situation using appropriate planning and by avoiding any hasty measures.
3. We should note that it was America that violated its commitments and is now claiming to want to return to the JCPOA, and it was not Iran that violated the agreement. Therefore, we must be careful that the place of the defendant and claimant do not change places.
4. What should be on the agenda and be a priority for Iran is the removal of the sanctions in action. The US and the West must accept in action and carry out whatever is necessary in this respect. This is not in conflict with the JCPOA and not beyond it. The JCPOA was created to remove the sanctions against Iran that are in conflict with it. When they are not willing to talk about guarantees and the future activities of companies, how can we be sure that they are honest about truly removing the sanctions! This is not a problem created by Iran that we cannot transfer or use our money in foreign banks due to a ban on Iran’s use of U-turn transactions because it is a primary sanction not secondary, and which apparently has nothing to do with the JCPOA. While this problem and similar problems have not been resolved, what guarantee is there that we will be able to receive and spend our oil revenues under a new agreement in the way that the conditions for Iran’s use of its benefits under the nuclear agreement have provided?
The negotiations must be only on nuclear issues, and raising and discussing any other unrelated issue must be removed from the agenda. A regional presence and influence along with missiles are Iran’s tools of strength and are not negotiable by any means.
6. Any nuclear measures carried out by Iran should be in accordance with the removal of sanctions. If after complete fulfillment of the nuclear commitments, particularly sending abroad nuclear reserves, the other side does not fulfill its commitments or there are obstacles to its fulfillment of its commitments, then we will be at a loss for a long time.
7. While taking the necessary actions to remove the sanctions, neutralizing the sanctions must be a serious part of the agenda of the country in such a way that the tool of imposing sanctions is taken away from the US.
At the end, it should be noted that in the Islamic Republic of Iran there are no authorities or institutions that are against coming to a good agreement that leads to the removal of the sanctions in action. But considering our previous experience, we must be more conscious and more careful. The problems I mentioned here are related to content, and if they are not resolved, Iran will not be able to benefit in practice. These are issues about which the other side has been notified and they are still open for discussion.
